In her response to my paper on demand curves and welfare (Houston 1997) , Dawkins (1997) argues that (1) I have not dealt with suffering as she defined it and (2) the measure of welfare that I favoured is worse than previous measures. I argue in response to (1) that Dawkins' case rests on a misinterpretation of my model and in response to (2) that all Dawkins has shown is the obvious point that any single measure of a curve may not contain all the information that can be obtained from the curve.
(1) Regarding the nature of suffering, Dawkins (1997) states: 'Suffering is not, as Houston seems to imply, something that occurs whenever an animal is slightly more motivated to do one thing rather than another.' I do not understand why she thinks that I imply this. As far as I can see, her claim is based on a fundamental confusion about what I have done. I spelt out (page 983) three components of Dawkins' argument, and pointed out that I was dealing only with the third one, that is, the relationship between demand curves and fitness or perceived net benefit. (I have phrased the current discussion in terms of fitness, but the arguments also apply to perceived net benefit.)
In line with the quotations from Dawkins (1990, pp. 2, 7) (see also Dawkins 1988), I explicitly state in several places that I am investigating whether the slope or the elasticity of the demand curve is correlated with the loss in fitness if an animal is prevented from performing the activity. Thus any putative suffering is being considered to occur not during the determination of the demand curve but during a subsequent period of deprivation. During the determination of the demand curve, the animal can be viewed as choosing between two activities (Dawkins 1997, page 1119) but because I am not considering suffering in this context, Dawkins' objection to this, that it does not deal with the 'acute ''highest priority'' aspect of suffering', is irrelevant. The potential for suffering that I am considering (see pp. 893, 894) is when the animal is deprived of the possibility of performing the activity whose demand curve has been measured. It is, of course, possible that determining the demand curve may involve suffering (see, for example, Dawkins 1990 pp. 53-54) but this is not something that I discussed. (I point out below that contra Dawkins 1997 even in the context of determining the demand curve the animal in my model may suffer a significant loss in fitness.) Dawkins (1997) continues the paragraph from which I have quoted (page 893) with an elaboration of her worry about the procedure I consider in my model being an inappropriate context for analysing suffering. Although I believe that I have already refuted this objection by pointing out that I was not concerned with suffering during the procedure for determining demand, I will respond to the further points she raises.
Dawkins emphasizes her view that I consider an animal that has plenty of time:
One of the rules he considers is explicitly formulated for a situation in which the animal never runs out of time. If an animal has plenty of time to do what it wants, it is perhaps not surprising that he is able to conclude that demand can be elastic or inelastic depending on what rule the animal is following. The issue of prioritizing behaviour (of being able to do a behaviour only if costs in time and in opportunities to do other important behaviours are paid) do not arise.
These remarks may well mislead the unwary reader. It is important to note the following.
(1) The rule Dawkins mentions was introduced in a short section on the consequences of animals following simple rules rather than maximizing something. Even if Dawkins' objection to this rule 
